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I. Introduction 
 Picture a high school science class.  What comes to mind?  Perhaps a teacher writing out 
equations on a chalk board.  Maybe a cluster of students performing a simple chemistry 
experiment.  It may seem fairly innocuous, maybe even a little dull, depending on your academic 
preferences.  Whatever you pictured, it hardly seems like the setting for one of the most 
contentious issues in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, but that is precisely what it is.  More 
precisely, the debate centers on biology, and the issue of the origins of life.  Almost from its very 
inception, Darwin’s theory of evolution has generated opposition from those whose religious 
beliefs conflict with the theory.1  Those whose beliefs conflict with evolution are of course free 
to disagree, but the confrontation has spilled over into the public school setting.  Children must 
attend school, and have no choice over what they learn, including the theory of evolution.  This 
understandably upsets those parents who feel that forcing their children to learn evolution 
undermines the religious beliefs they have instilled in their children.2 In order to counter-act this 
perceived influence, school boards and government entities have attempted numerous strategies 
to banish or subvert the teaching of evolution in public school science classes.3   
 Over the years, governmental entities have tried different strategies to either excise 
evolution or inject religious beliefs into the biology curriculum.4  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
addressed these attempts on different occasions.  It prohibited banning evolution outright on 
Establishment Clause grounds; it held that governments cannot refuse to teach a valid scientific 
theory simply because it conflicts with certain beliefs of a religious group.5  The Court had 
seemingly disposed of the issue in 1987, when it decided Edwards v. Aguillard.6  In that case, 
the Court found that a “balanced treatment” statute also violated the Establishment Clause.7  It 
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seemed to be a cut and dried conclusion: governments could not mandate the teaching of 
creationism alongside of evolution in public school science classes.8  It was in the aftermath of 
the Edwards decision that the new theory of Intelligent Design began to gain momentum.9 
 Intelligent Design will be explained in greater detail below.  For now, it is enough to note 
that it is an alternate theory of human origins which has been used to challenge the teaching of 
evolution in  public school science curricula.  Opponents of Intelligent Design claim that it is 
nothing more than previously banned creationist theory dressed up in pseudo-scientific 
terminology.  But, as proponents of the theory strenuously point out, the theory of Intelligent 
Design consciously avoids overt religiosity, and Styles itself as a valid scientific theory, based 
upon empirical evidence.  This is the latest phase in the controversy surrounding evolution in 
public schools.  What makes this particular theory hard to deal with is that Intelligent Design 
seems custom-built to fit through loopholes that exist in Edwards.  The question left to courts to 
answer is: can Intelligent Design be taught alongside evolution in public school science classes, 
where overtly religious creationist theories cannot?   
 In the first judicial test of a school district’s Intelligent Design (ID) policy, in Kitzmiller 
v. Dover Area School District, the answer was a resounding no.10  The district court in that case 
went to great pains to show that Intelligent Design was not a scientific theory, and was in fact 
inherently religious.11  The court went on to find that teaching Intelligent Design in public school 
science classes violates the Establishment Clause.12  However, if there is one thing history has 
taught us, it is that this debate is far from over.  Intriguing questions still linger.  Did the 
Kitzmiller court get it right?  Will teaching Intelligent Design always violate the Establishment 
Clause, or is there a set of circumstances under which it could evade unconstitutionality? 
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The goal of this paper is to examine the theory of Intelligent Design and the relevant 
constitutional jurisprudence to determine if and when Intelligent Design could be constitutionally 
taught in public school science curricula.  In order to accomplish this goal, I will look to the 
relevant theories that have been used to gain a better understanding of the terms this paper will 
be dealing with throughout.  Next, I will examine the relevant constitutional jurisprudence, to see 
how courts are likely to deal with an Establishment Clause challenge to teaching Intelligent 
Design in public schools.  Then, I will attempt to apply the tests a court is likely to use to 
determine if there exists a set of circumstances under which Intelligent Design can be 
constitutionally taught.  Finally, I will discuss whether there are any other contexts in which 
Intelligent Design may be taught outside the science classroom. 
II. The Relevant Theories 
 First and foremost, before examining the current constitutional jurisprudential landscape 
surrounding evolution, creationism and intelligent design (ID) within public school science 
curricula, it will be beneficial to briefly define those three theories in order to frame the issue. 
 
IIA. Evolution 
 The theory of evolution is generally credited to Charles Darwin, which he expounded in 
his seminal work, “On the Origin of Species.”13  Darwin’s theory posits that: 
species of flora and fauna do not permanently exist in their present forms.  Rather, 
they vary over time as individual members develop inheritable adaptations to their 
natural environments that make them more likely to survive than members of the 
same species that have not changed or have changed in less advantageous ways. 
Mutations upon mutations lead to diversification within, and eventually among, 
species.14   
 
This process is often called Natural Selection.15   
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 As our understanding of genetics has improved, the next major leap in evolutionary 
theory has been taken.16  We now know that these adaptations are the product of variations 
within a species’ genes, and that they arise from adaptation as well as mutation.17  
 Today, the theory of evolution can be broken down into two general categories, 
microevolution and macroevolution.18  Microevolution embraces the idea that genetic diversity 
within a species, over time and through the process of sexual selection is responsible for 
differentiation within the species.19  Macroevolution is an extension of microevolution, in that it 
posits that over time the differentiation within a species will lead to the creation of a new species 
distinct from the initial species.20  Looking backward, macroevolution posits that all species 
come from a common ancestor, and that the process of microevolution can best explain the 
existence and variety of life on earth as we know it today. 21 
 The theory of evolution is considered to be the cornerstone of any study of biology.22 It 
enjoys the overwhelming support of the scientific community today, and is widely regarded as 
well a substantiated theory as exists in modern science.23  
 
IIB. Creationism 
Generally speaking, creationism rejects the theory of evolution and believes instead that 
each species on earth was put there by a divine being.24  The Dictionary of Science and 
Creationism defines creationism as the belief in the creation of the universe, including man and 
all other life forms, by a supernatural creator as specifically described in the biblical book of 
Genesis.25  The primary creationist perspectives are categorized as Young Earth Creationism, 
Old Earth Creationism and Theistic Evolution Theory.26 
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 Young Earth creationists adhere to a “strict and literal interpretation of the Bible, which 
asserts that all organisms were formed on the Earth in a single event and that God created plants, 
animals and humans in their final forms.”27  They do not believe that the earth is billions of years 
old, instead positing that the earth is closer to 6,000 to 10,000 years old.28  They reject the 
position that humans descended from a lower order of animal.29 They maintain that humans were 
created fully formed, as we appear today, distinct and separate from other life forms.30 
 One scholar aptly described Old Earth creationists as follows: “As the name suggests, 
old-earth creationists concede the earth to be billions of years old. They maintain that God 
individually created ‘kinds’ of plants and animals sequentially over great spans of time, and that 
God works through biological processes to create diversity within species.”31 Both Young Earth 
and Old Earth creationists agree with microevolution’s stance that changes can occur within 
species over time, but they reject the theory of common descent and maintain, based on the book 
of Genesis’ account of divine creation, that humans were created separately.32 They maintain the 
essential belief that humans are unique: even if evolution can explain the diversity of life in 
lower orders of plants and animals, human beings never shared a common ancestor with other 
animals and we were created distinctly by God in essentially the same form we now embody. 
 The beliefs of Theistic Evolution Theorists have been described as such: 
[They] do not subscribe to a literal interpretation of Genesis, but still adhere to an 
idea of divine creation and consider the natural processes identified by Darwin as 
a plan intended for the world by a Creator. Specifically, they believe that a God 
created time, space, and matter, but left the majority of life changes to the natural 
workings of evolution. They believe one species can give rise to another 
consistent with Darwin’s theory. 33   
 
As of 1996, this perspective was the Catholic Church’s official position on the origin of 
life.34 
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IIC. Intelligent Design 
 Intelligent Design (ID) is a theory that maintains that intelligent agency, as an aspect of 
scientific theory-making, has more explanatory power in accounting for the complexity of some 
physical systems, including biological entities and the existence of the universe as a whole, than 
the blind forces of nature.35 Though proponents of ID claim that it can be demonstrated across a 
variety of scientific disciplines,36 my focus is on how ID attempts to explain the origins and 
diversity of life in the field of biology.  The theory holds that living things are too complex to 
have arisen by chance, and therefore must be the work of a designer.37  However, proponents of 
ID are quick to point out that ID is not a religious theory.38  They do not speculate on who or 
what such a designer might be or when such a design occurred and claim to have no commitment 
to defending the book of Genesis story of creation or any other religious tenet.39   ID simply 
claims that the presence and actions of some kind of intelligent designer are responsible for 
creating complex living things.40   
One aspect of ID is that it attempts to show gaps in the theory of evolution because if 
such gaps do exist, this demonstrates inherent flaws in evolutionary theory.41  Gaps in the theory 
of evolution it exposes are used as evidence that if evolution cannot explain it, it must be 
something else, and that something else must be an intelligent designer.42  ID purports to be a 
scientific theory which is empirically provable; as one scholar notes, “At the core of ID research 
is the set of criteria by which its proponents claim they can detect or falsify design.”43  The two 
main premises upon which ID proponents depend to prove this assertion are the concepts of 
“specified complexity” and “irreducible complexity.” 44 Specified complexity was proposed by 
ID proponent and mathematician William Dembski who enumerated three components to 
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specified complexity: contingency, complexity and specification.45  To simplify as much as 
possible, specified complexity estimates the probability that a given structure or pattern could 
have arisen by chance.46  When a structure is both complex (made up of multiple parts) and 
specified (containing a coherent pattern or formation) simultaneously and the probability of such 
complexity and specification occurring together is low enough, then one can infer intelligent 
design.47  Dembski illustrates this phenomenon in different ways: “A single letter of the alphabet 
is specified without being complex (i.e., it conforms to an independently given pattern but is 
simple). A long sequence of random letters is complex without being specified (i.e., it requires a 
complicated instruction-set to characterize but conforms to no independently given pattern). A 
Shakespearean sonnet is both complex and specified.”48 He states that biological details of living 
things can be similarly characterized, such as “bacterial flagellum that are wonderfully complex, 
elegant, and integrated.”49  
 The second major premise ID uses to prove life is too complex to have arisen randomly is 
irreducible complexity.  Irreducible complexity was put forth by biochemist Michael Behe.50  He 
starts with the premise that if a complex system could not have been formed through successive, 
slight evolutionary changes, then the theory of evolution cannot account for such systems.51  
Behe defines an irreducibly complex system as a single system composed of several well-
matched interacting parts that each contribute to the basic function of the system.52 Removal of 
any one of the parts of an irreducibly complex system would cause it to effectively cease 
functioning, since each part depends on the others to produce the system’s function.53   To 
illustrate this point, one can think of a car engine.  If one essential part of the engine is removed, 
the engine does not function; it relies on all parts functioning in their separate roles together in 
order to work as a cohesive whole.  If removing one part would cause the entire system to fail, 
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Behe would argue that it then follows that any intermediate form of the part would not allow the 
system to function either. He argues that changing the form one part takes is tantamount to 
removing it, with the same result.54 A more rudimentary form of the part will not function in the 
same way as the current form of the part, and the current form is the only form that allows the 
system to function as it is supposed to.55  If the part could not have gradually changed into what 
it currently is, he argues, it must have been designed as it is and not formed and changed through 
natural selection.56   
 In sum, specified complexity and irreducible complexity are essentially offered as 
scientific proofs of design.  Specified complexity is offered as a way to set criteria for detecting 
design, and an irreducibly complex system exhibits all the characteristics the criteria are meant to 
detect.57  ID attempts to use accepted scientific methods to prove that evolution cannot account 
for existence of complex organisms and this in turn means that such organisms must have been 
designed by an intelligent designer.   
There is a problem with this conclusion, aside from its questionable validity and 
widespread disapproval from the majority of the scientific community which in themselves are 
not insubstantial hurdles.58 The problem is that the existence of an intelligent designer cannot be 
proven or tested for using the same scientific methods ID proponents use to discredit evolution.59  
There is no small irony in that, but the problem for ID proponents is that their search for an 
intelligent designer cannot be considered science as that term is defined by the scientific 
community.  So they face not only the task of disproving evolution in the context of complex 
systems and organisms, but the additional hurdle of changing the definition of what constitutes 
“good” science so that an intelligent designer may be included.  This dual debate over whether 
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their methods in dismissing evolution are valid and whether Intelligent Design may be 
considered science at all will be discussed in greater detail below. 
III. The State of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in Regards to Evolution 
 The teaching of evolution in public schools as an explanation of human origins has 
generated much controversy throughout its tenure as an accepted scientific theory.60  Throughout 
the years, governmental entities have used various alternative theories of origin to supplant, 
supplement or qualify the teaching of evolution in public schools; ID is the newest of such 
alternative theories.61  Because these theories of human origin touch upon religion, courts have 
scrutinized such government policies under the Establishment Clause, to ensure that the 
government is not impermissibly establishing a religious doctrine.62   Examining the way the 
United States Supreme Court has analyzed previous governmental policies regarding the 
teaching of human origins in public school science classes, and how some lower courts have 
dealt with similar issues, will provide a framework for how courts in the future will likely handle 
challenged ID policies.   
IIIA.  Epperson v. State of Arkansas 
 The 1968 case of Epperson v. Arkansas was the U.S. Supreme Court’s first case dealing 
with the issues of creationism and evolution in public school science curricula63.  The statute in 
question was enacted in 1928 and was based upon the Tennessee law at issue in the famous 
Scopes Monkey Trial in 1927.64  The Arkansas statute made it a misdemeanor for any public 
school teacher to teach the “theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower 
order of animal,” which would result in the dismissal of the offending teacher.65  The Little Rock 
school district purchased a biology textbook in 1965 that contained a chapter detailing man’s 
descent from a lower order of animal.66  This put the teacher in question, Susan Epperson, in a 
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dilemma:  she had to teach from the book the school district prescribed, but if she did she would 
violate the statute and be subject to dismissal.67 
 In its decision, the Court found that the prohibition of teaching evolution was a violation 
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.68 In setting out its opinion the Court noted 
that the First Amendment commands that the government must be neutral in matters of religious 
theory and doctrine, and may not aid, foster, or promote one religion against another.69  The 
Court also noted that states have a strong interest in determining their own public school 
curricula, and as a general matter, courts should not interfere in the daily operation of public 
schools.70 However, the Court stated that it will intervene into conflicts involving school 
curricula where constitutional interests are implicated, and that nowhere was “the vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms more vital than in the community of American schools.”71  
The Court looked to the primary purpose and effect of the enactment, and stated that if either is 
found to be the advancement or inhibition of religion then it unconstitutional.72 In looking to 
purpose, the Court found that Arkansas had offered no justification for the law under state 
policy.73  It further found that sectarian fundamentalist conviction could be the only reason the 
law was passed; it was intended solely single out a particular theory because of its supposed 
conflict with the biblical creation story.74  The state was not seeking to excise all discussions of 
the origin of man from its public school curricula, only one theory which conflicted with a literal 
reading of the Bible.75  This ran afoul of the constitutional mandate of neutrality, which violated 
the Establishment Clause.76 
  This case is important for purposes of this paper in that it effectively laid the 
groundwork for future creationism and science education cases analyzed under the Establishment 
Clause, by focusing on the legislature’s non-secular purpose and intent in passing the law.  It is 
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also important to note that the Court was willing to look to the origin and history of the statute, 
including public reaction, which helped to expose its inherently religious nature.77  To sum up, 
the import of Epperson was that a “frontal assault” on evolution in public school science classes 
would not be permitted under the Establishment Clause.78  States were no longer free to ban the 
teaching of evolution because it conflicts with religious teaching.79 
 
IIIB. McLean v.  Arkansas Board of Education 
 The McLean case was a 1982 Eastern District of Arkansas case dealing with a so-called 
“Balanced Treatment Act.”80  The Act stated that public schools “shall give balanced treatment 
to creation-science and to evolution-science.”81  It defined creation science as “the scientific 
evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific evidences.”82  Despite the fact that it 
is only a district court case, and that the Supreme Court would deal with a very similar statute 
five years later in Edwards v. Aguillard, it is still worthwhile to examine McLean in detail.   The 
court’s method of analysis is important to note, particularly the way it interpreted the Lemon test, 
and the way it went about determining scientific merit in the challenged policy, which will 
become a vital issue in ID cases.  Additionally, McLean was the first case to hold that teaching 
creationism in a public school was in and of itself a religious teaching in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.83 
The statute in question mandated equal treatment in public schools to “creation science” 
and “evolution science.”  The court analyzed the policy under the Lemon Test, first articulated in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, a Supreme Court case from 1971.84  Lemon stated that in order to survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny, a statute must: 1) have a secular purpose; 2) produce a primary 
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effect that neither enhances nor inhibits religion; and 3) not foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion.85 
 In applying the Lemon test, however, the McLean court expanded the purpose prong.  
The court focused on whether the legislature’ actual motivation was to promote religion, instead 
of simply required finding a valid secular purpose, even if other religious purposes were 
present.86 In looking to legislative purpose, the court focused on the history and motivations of 
the bill’s author and sponsor, but also went farther in examining the history of creationists’ 
opposition to evolution, both in general and in the state of Arkansas.87  It also focused on the 
unusual events surrounding the bill’s passage (no scientific testimony, no experts from the 
department of education, no findings of fact, etc.) and even the motives of Arkansas residents 
who pushed for the bill.88  Taken all together, all the apparent favorable bias toward religion was 
enough for the court to determine that there was no secular purpose, only the purpose to 
introduce the biblical version of creation into the public schools.89 
 What is interesting is how far back the court was willing to go to establish a link between 
“creation-science” and fundamentalist opposition to evolution as a contradiction of the literal 
truth of the Bible.90  Normally, the bill’s author’s statements, such as his intent to “kill 
evolution,” and linking evolution to social ills such as Nazism, and his view of the whole debate 
as a “battle between God and anti-God forces” should have been enough to show an actual 
motivation to advance religion.91  But, by establishing a link with fundamentalist hostility toward 
religion all the way back to the 1920s, it seems the court was trying to send the message that no 
matter what the legislative history, creationism could never escape its ties to fundamentalism, 
and it’s obviously religious motives.92  The Court in Epperson documented the fundamentalist 
link with the statute at issue there simply because the statute was passed in the 1920s at the 
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height of that period’s upswing in fundamentalism, and so was an integral part of the “historical 
context of the act” which was fit for consideration.93  In McLean, the court saw the historical 
context of the statute as part of an unbroken line of those with religious motivations attempting 
to inject biblical creation into public schools, not simply as the historical context around the time 
the law was passed.94  The fact that the court could link the motives of the legislature to this 
historical motive just added more weight in deciding that the statute’s purpose was to advance 
religion. 
 Perhaps the most important thing to note about the McLean case was the court’s 
willingness to go beyond legislative motive and historical context and declare that the purpose of 
the statute was religious because the creation-science it mandated was both religious and not 
science at all.95  The court first began by noting that the definition of creation-science in the act 
was clearly identical to the first eleven chapters of Genesis, and then noted that creation from 
nothing involved belief in a supernatural intervention, which it found to be inherently religious, 
despite being presented as science.96  Once the court had defined creation-science as manifestly 
religious, it removed all doubt that the purpose of the statute was religious by finding that it was 
not science.97  This court, unlike the court in Epperson, gave a definition of the essential 
characteristics of science: 1) It is guided by natural law; 2) It has to be explanatory in reference 
to natural law; 3) It is testable against the empirical world; 4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. 
not the final word; and 5) It is falsifiable.98  The court adopted this standard based upon expert 
testimony given at trial.99  It is important to note that court never defined explicitly what it meant 
by “natural law.”  However, it did refer to the fact that divine creation could not be science, as 
the court defined it, because we cannot know the processes used, or if the processes exist or 
operate in the natural universe.100  It would seem that the court meant naturally occurring, 
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observable and predictable processes, such as the laws of physics when referring to natural law.  
The distinction is important only to distinguish the court’s use of “natural law” as a defining 
characteristic of science in this case from the term as used by legal philosophers in other 
contexts.101 
 Applying this standard, the court found creation-science as defined in the statute could 
not be science for a variety of reasons.  Among other things, the court found that creation-
science’s dependence on supernatural intervention, lack of general acceptance within the 
scientific community, its absolutist and dogmatic methodology where a supreme being must 
always be the answer, and its false dual dichotomy where any evidence against evolution must 
mean support for creation science all fail to qualify under the court’s five-part definition of 
science.102  Once the policy was found not to be science, the court determined that it could not 
enhance science education, and because it was also inherently religious, it was 
unconstitutional.103  Without getting into too much more detail, it is enough to note for now that 
many of the arguments made on behalf of creation-science to be considered science that were 
rejected by the court in McLean are nearly identical to the arguments that proponents of ID 
would use later in attempting to justify ID as science. 
IIIC. Edwards v. Aguillard 
 In 1987, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Edwards v. Aguillard, taking on 
a balanced treatment statute from Louisiana similar to the one at issue in McLean.104  The act at 
issue in Edwards forbid the teaching of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by 
instruction in creation science.105  No school was required to teach evolution or creation science, 
but if either was taught, the other must also be taught.106   The statute defined evolution and 
creation science as “the scientific evidence for creation or evolution and the inferences from 
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those scientific evidences.”107  The Court analyzed the statute under the Lemon Test, noting that 
it was the appropriate test in this context.108 
 In applying the Lemon test, the Court again reiterated that states and local school boards 
are generally given considerable discretion in operating their public schools and setting their 
curricula.109 However, the Court again stated that the public elementary and secondary school 
setting must be closely monitored, as “families entrust public schools with the education of their 
children, but condition that trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be 
used to advance religious views . . . Students in such institutions are impressionable and their 
attendance is mandatory.”110   
 Under the purpose prong of Lemon, the Court, as did the court in McLean, chose to apply 
a strict interpretation, asking whether a government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove 
of religion through examination of legislative intent.111  The court went on that an intention to 
promote religion is clear when the state enacts the law to serve a religious purpose, evidenced by 
promotion of religion in general, or by advancement of a particular religious belief.112  The Court 
also noted that in finding legislative purpose, it is proper to consider the plain words of the 
statute, the legislative history, historical context, and the sequence of events that led to the 
passage of the statute.113  Here, Louisiana stated that it’s purpose in enacting this statute was to 
promote academic freedom, but the Court noted that though it is normally deferential to the 
state’s stated purpose, that stated purpose must be “sincere and not a sham.”114   
 The Supreme Court struck down the Louisiana statute, finding that it failed the secular 
purpose prong of the Lemon test.115  The Court looked to the legislative history and determined 
the purpose of the bill’s sponsor was to “narrow the science curriculum” in favor of a religious 
doctrine, not “teaching all the evidence with respect to the origins of human beings.”116  The 
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Court noted the bill’s sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, had made his intent clear when he said he 
would prefer that neither evolution nor creationism be taught, and that he disdained evolution 
because it conflicted with his religious views.  Under legislative motivation, the Court also noted 
that the same “historic and contemporaneous antagonism” between certain religious doctrines 
and evolution that helped illuminate religious purpose in both Epperson and McLean were 
present in this case as well.117  Perhaps the most damaging to the state, the Court noted that both 
Senator Keith and the creation experts he relied on all admitted that the theory of creation 
science included belief in the existence of a supernatural creator.118  The court concluded from 
this that the legislative history showed that “creation science as contemplated by the legislature . 
. . embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of 
human kind.”  From this, the Court concluded that the act was designed to either promote a 
theory which embodied a religious tenet, or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific theory that is 
disfavored by a particular religious sect, both of which are prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause.119 The Court also pointed out that the act did not grant teachers any more freedom than 
they already possessed, as they were already allowed to teach anything based on established fact.  
It went on to note that if Louisiana truly wished to maximize the effectiveness and 
comprehensiveness of the science curriculum, it would have encouraged teaching of all theories; 
instead the bill prevented the teaching of only one theory.120  Many other factors combined to 
show that Louisiana had no secular purpose in enacting the law.  These factors included the 
comments of Senator Keith; the historic conflict between certain Christians and evolution; the 
fact that the act would not actually advance academic freedom; that the legislature singled out 
evolution; and that the act itself promoted teaching a religious tenet.  The culmination of all these 
 18
factors was enough to convince the Court that there was no secular purpose, and that therefore 
the act was invalid under the purpose prong of Lemon, and unconstitutional.121   
 The state argued that it had evidence that creation science as defined in the act, was in 
fact a valid scientific theory, despite any religious underpinnings.122 If that were proven to be 
true, the policy could pass the first prong of Lemon; teaching valid science in a science class is 
clearly a secular purpose.123  However, the Court would not rule on whether or not this brand of 
creation science was in fact science.  The Court explained that since the evidence the state 
wished to use was produced after the state passed the act, it was of no relevance in finding the 
legislature’s purpose in passing the act.124  This left an open question of what would happen if 
the state had relied on such expert testimony before they passed the act, or what would happen if 
a theory that could be called scientific but nevertheless embraced or embodied certain religious 
tenets.125  It is also important to note also that the Court went out of it’s way to say that it “does 
not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific 
theories be taught” and that “teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of 
humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing 
science instruction.”126 The issue of whether a given program or theory can be defined as 
science then is a critical issue in determining its constitutional validity.  Under the Court’s 
reasoning in Edwards, if a theory was validly scientific, either in its own right, or as a critique of 
evolution, then it might pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause.  It is this 
loophole that ID proponents hope to exploit in order to have ID taught in a public school science 
class.127 
 
IIID. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District 
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 We have seen how courts have dealt with attempts to insert creationist theories into 
public school science curricula.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards, it was assumed 
by many that the debate was pretty much over; creationist’s attempts to ban evolution or give 
equal time to “creation-science” had failed.128  This was not the end to challenges to evolution 
however.  It was around this time that the theory of Intelligent Design began to gain support as a 
way to challenge evolution in the classroom.129  Opponents of ID will argue that it is simply the 
creationist argument recast in different terms to get around the Court’s ruling in Edwards, but ID 
proponents maintain that the theory is not religiously affiliated and is scientifically valid.130  If 
ID can be found to be scientifically valid, then any overlap with a particular religious belief does 
not render it less so, and may stand up as a valid secular purpose.  The assertions that ID is 
religiously neutral and scientifically viable posed a challenge to the reasoning in Edwards, which 
stated that teaching a variety of scientific theories might validly be done, and also relied on the 
religious nature of the challenged pedagogy.131  Therefore, the critical questions facing a court in 
determining the constitutionality of teaching ID in a public school science curriculum would be 
whether or not ID can be considered religious, and whether or not it can be considered 
scientific.132  If ID could be found not to be religious, then Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
can be avoided altogether and it would become an issue of curriculum choice which the Supreme 
Court has said it will be reluctant to delve into without First Amendment concerns.133  And 
similarly, if ID can be considered science, it can be included if the clear, secular intent is to 
enhance the effectiveness of science instruction.  If it can be deemed science, the fact that it 
coincides with certain religious beliefs would not be enough to invalidate it.134  These were the 
issues the court faced in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District, an Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania case decided in late 2005.135   
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 This case arose in response to a press release by the Dover Area School District which 
stated that public school teachers would be required to read a statement to ninth grade biology 
students which criticized evolution and encouraged students to examine ID.  The statement read  
 “The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin’s 
Theory of Evolution and eventually take a standardized test on which evolution is a 
part.  Because Darwin’s Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence 
is discovered.  The Theory is not a fact.  Gaps in the Theory exist for which there is 
no evidence. . . Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs 
from Darwin’s view.  The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for 
students who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent 
Design actually involves.  With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to 
keep an open mind.  The school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life to 
individual students and their families.”  
 
Kitzmller v. DASD. 
 In analyzing the constitutionality of the ID policy, the court noted the applicability of the 
Lemon test, but also determined that analysis under the endorsement test was also proper.  The 
endorsement test was first articulated by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence in Lynch v. 
Donnelly, and was adopted by a majority of the Court in Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe.136  That case was decided in 1989, two years after Edwards. The goal of the Endorsement 
Test is to prohibit actual or reasonably perceived government endorsement of religion.137  In the 
words of Justice O’Connor in a previous case, “Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”138  In 
determining if a policy in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion, the 
Court will analyze what message a policy conveys to a “reasonable, objective observer, who 
knows the policy’s language, origins, and legislative history, as well as the history of the 
community and the broader social and historical context in which the policy arose.”139  This 
fictional observer will be one of the class of people the message was intended to reach.140  The 
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net effect of the endorsement test is that perceived government purpose and perceived 
government effect can be deciding factors when determining the constitutionality of a challenged 
government action.141 
 The court in Kitzmiller noted that the Supreme Court had consistently applied the 
endorsement test in Establishment Clause cases, including religion in public school settings, and 
decided that it must apply the endorsement test first, and then apply Lemon.142  Using the 
endorsement test, the court analyzed whether the objective observer would know that ID is a 
creationist, religious strategy that evolved from earlier forms of creationism.143  From that 
starting point, it went on to analyze whether an objective student would view the statement 
regarding ID as state endorsement of religion, as they were the intended audience.144  It also 
determined whether an objective adult member of the community would view the school board’s 
conduct as an endorsement of religion, because the board had engaged the public defending its 
policy and thus made the general public in the community an intended audience as well.145 
 The court first held that an objective, reasonable observer would know that both ID and a 
plan to inform students of problems with evolutionary theory are creationist, religious 
strategies.146  In so finding, the court relied on four reasons why the observer would know ID is a 
religious strategy that could be found in the social context and history of the ID movement. The 
first was that the main premise of ID, namely the existence of an intelligent designer, had its 
intellectual roots in religious arguments for the existence of God, most notably the arguments of 
theologians Thomas Aquinas and William Paley.147  The court noted that although ID does not 
acknowledge that the designer is God, it concedes that the intelligent designer works outside the 
laws of nature and science.148   
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The second reason the court cited is that leading proponents of the ID movement 
themselves describe ID as a religious argument.149  The court cited to a written statement made 
by Philip Johnson, whom it considered to be “the father of the ID movement,” saying “theistic 
realism” and “mere creation” are defining concepts of the ID movement, meaning that “God is 
objectively real as Creator and recorded in the biological evidence.” 150 William Dembski, the 
leading proponent of the ID theory of specified complexity had written that ID is a “ground 
clearing operation” to allow Christianity to receive serious consideration, and that “Christ is 
never an addendum to a scientific theory but always a completion.”151 Perhaps most persuasive 
to the court in determining that the ID movement considers itself religious was the so-called 
“Wedge Document.”  The Wedge Document was prepared by the Discovery Institute’s Center 
for Science and Culture.152  The Discovery Institute is a conservative think tank that was founded 
in 1991, and is a major proponent of the ID movement.153  The Institute’s fellows include 
William Dembski and Michael Behe.154 The Wedge Document posits that the ID movement’s 
“Governing Goals” include replacing science as currently practiced with “theistic and Christian 
science.”155  The court found that the document revealed cultural and religious goals, not 
scientific ones. It also found that ID aspires to change the ground rules of science to make room 
for religion, specifically beliefs consonant with a particular version of Christianity.156   
Third, the court found that notwithstanding the labels ID proponents themselves would 
put on it, the religious nature of ID is evident because it involves the existence of a supernatural 
creator, which the courts in McLean and Edwards found made creationism a religious 
proposition.157  The court noted that the existence of a supernatural designer is a hallmark of ID, 
and that not one defense expert was able to explain how the supernatural action suggested by ID 
could be anything other than an inherently religious concept.158  Further proof that ID requires a 
 23
supernatural creator was found in the court’s study of the ID textbook suggested to students by 
the school district, Of Pandas and People.159  The court examined different drafts of the book, 
one written before Edwards invalidated teaching “creation-science,” and one revised after.  In 
the pre-Edwards draft, the book defined creation science, which was found to be inherently 
religious in Edwards.  In the post-Edwards draft, the court found that creation science was 
excised, and that ID was substituted in its place.160 The current definition of ID was exactly the 
same as the pre-Edwards definition of creation science.  It also found that over 150 mentions of 
the word creation were systematically replaced with the phrase ID; and that the changes all 
occurred shortly after the decision in Edwards.161  Though the words had changed, the inherently 
religious content had not.  Simply changing the phrase creation science to the phrase Intelligent 
Design could not divorce it from its inherent religiosity.162 
And fourth the court also noted that ID uses the same or exceedingly similar arguments 
as creationism, even if divorced from Pandas.163  The court found that while ID does not 
mention creationism, the book of Genesis, or young earth, it is substantially similar in all other 
respects to the conclusions of “scientific” creationism.164  The court found that these four factors 
provided the social and historical context in which ID arose of which a reasonable observer, 
whether adult or child, would be aware.165 
 The court next focused on whether an objective student would view the school district 
policy as official endorsement of religion.166  In doing so, the court examined the language of the 
disclaimer mandated by the policy itself, the classroom presentation of the disclaimer, and the 
historical context surrounding the adoption of the policy, which included the board’s reasons for 
adopting it and the community debate it sparked.  First, the court found that the language of the 
disclaimer read to the students would send the message that the school would rather not teach 
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evolution, but that state academic standards require it to.167  The court also found the disclaimer 
would send the message that the school is singling out evolution from all else in the science 
curriculum as “just a theory.” The court found that such language suggested to students that 
evolution is only a highly questionable opinion or hunch, not a reliable scientific theory.168  
Since the court had already found that ID is a religious view, it also found that suggesting Pandas 
as a valid alternative to evolution would be seen as urging students to contemplate alternative 
religious concepts.169     
 Secondly, the court examined the way in which the students were exposed to the 
disclaimer.  The science teachers refused to read it, and so school administrators came into the 
classrooms, which the court found carried the message that the disclaimer was special and 
carried extra weight.170  The court also found that the fact that students are able to opt out of 
hearing the disclaimer makes it a novelty, which enhances the importance of the disclaimer in the 
students’ eyes. 171  
 According to the court, these elements, combined with what the students already know 
about the religious nature of ID, show that a reasonable, objective student would see the 
disclaimer as a strong message of official religious endorsement.172   
 Because the board brought the debate to the public by sending out a newsletter to all 
citizens, the court next looked to whether an objective Dover citizen would perceive the school 
board’s conduct to be an endorsement of religion.173  The court found that such an observer 
would perceive government endorsement of religion.  In doing so, the court examined many 
factors that the reasonable observer would know. These factors included the language of the 
disclaimer to be read to students, what the observer would infer from the language used in the 
newsletter, the Board’s actions at its public meetings and the tenor of the public debate that arose 
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before the Board adopted the policy.  The court found that the newsletter would be perceived as 
denigrating evolution and advocating ID.174   
The newsletter included the statements “the word evolution has several meanings, and 
those supporting Darwin’s theory of evolution use that confusion to their advantage,” and 
“[b]iology took away our status as made in the image of God,” and “advances in molecular 
biology and chemistry have shown us that . . . fundamental units of life processes cannot be 
explained by chance.”175 The court found that such statements would all lead to an objective 
observer to conclude that the board was attacking evolution and promoting the inherently 
religious theory of ID. 176 Furthermore, the record included many letters to the editor and 
editorials from the local newspapers, which revealed that the entire community consistently 
understood ID to be a religious concept, and that the controversy was about whether a religious 
view should be taught in the schools.177  Combining the board’s view expressed in the newsletter 
and the community’s understanding of the issue as one about the inclusion of religion in the 
schools with what an observer would know about the disclaimer itself (similar to what a student 
would infer) the court concluded that a reasonable, objective observer would see government 
endorsement of a religious view.178 
 After detailing how and why the school board’s policy failed the endorsement test, the 
court went on to declare that ID, while possibly true, was not science, and added that “whether 
ID is science . . . is essential to our holding that an Establishment Clause violation occurred in 
this case.”179  The court based its decision that ID is not science primarily on expert testimony 
from both the plaintiffs and the defendants.180  The court found that ID violates the centuries-old 
ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation; that the argument of 
irreducible complexity is flawed; that ID’s negative attacks on evolution have been refuted by 
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the scientific community; and that ID has failed to gain the acceptance in the scientific 
community.181 
 The court defined science as being limited to the search for natural causes to explain 
natural phenomena.182  It found that science restricts itself to testable, natural explanations about 
the natural world.  The National Academy of Sciences agreed that science is limited to empirical, 
observable and ultimately testable data, and that explanations that cannot be based upon 
empirical evidence are not a part of science.183  Science does not consider issues of “meaning” 
and “purpose” in the world, but restricts itself to the scientific method.184  The court noted that 
every major scientific organization that has taken a position has found that ID is not and cannot 
be science.185   The court noted that even ID experts admitted that unless the definition of science 
was expanded to include supernatural causation, ID could not be considered science.  The court 
concluded that science cannot be defined differently for Dover students than it is defined in the 
scientific community.186  The court viewed ID as an “affirmative action program for a view that 
has been unable to gain a foothold within the scientific community.”187   
 The court thought that ID’s failure to meet the ground rules of science was enough to 
conclude it was not science, but went further.  It stated that ID is based upon a false dichotomy, 
which relied on the premise that to the extent evolutionary theory is discredited, ID is 
confirmed.188  The court noted that this was essentially the same “contrived dualism” present in 
McLean, and failed as science here as well.189  It is faulty logic to assume that if evolution is 
wrong (which ID has not proven), that therefore ID is right.190  Insofar as ID proponents’ attacks 
on gaps in evolutionary theory, the court noted that simply because evolution cannot yet explain 
certain details of evolution does not mean the theory is incapable of doing so.191 
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 The court found that the cornerstone ID argument of irreducible complexity failed both as 
a positive argument in favor of ID, and also as a negative argument against evolution.192   
 The court finally noted the complete absence of peer-reviewed publications supporting 
ID.  The court found that the peer review process is “exquisitely important” in the scientific 
process, as it allows scientists to share empirical research and opens their hypotheses up to study, 
testing and criticism.193  The court also found that not only had ID proponents failed to produce 
peer-reviewed articles of studies featuring ID, but that ID theories did not feature any scientific 
research or testing.194 
 Based on these findings, the court found that a reasonable, objective observer would 
reach the inescapable conclusion that ID is an “interesting theological argument, but that it is not 
science.”195 
 Having concluded that the board’s policy failed the endorsement test, the court next 
turned to analyzing the policy under the Lemon test.   
 The court stated that the purpose prong of Lemon asks “whether government’s actual 
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion,” and that the court may consider the policy’s 
language, enlightened by its contemporaneous legislative history, the historical context of the 
enactment, and the specific sequence of events leading up to its passage.196  The court found that 
under the cumulative evidence, the district’s purpose was to advance creationism, an inherently 
religious view, both by introducing it under the label of ID and by disparaging the scientific 
theory of evolution.197   
 In coming to that conclusion, the court exhaustively documented the legislative history, 
and sequence of events that led to the policy’s passage.198  Without documenting every example 
the court cites, I will briefly outline the sequence of events it used in determining purpose.  In 
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2003, a board member repeatedly asserted that he was concerned with the teaching of evolution 
and stated he wanted creationism to be taught “fifty-fifty” with evolution.199  He was concerned 
about teachers presenting information to students that conflicted with the religious message 
parents taught at home. He felt the disparity would leave students with the impression that 
“someone is lying.”200 He also stated that the concept of common ancestry offended his religious 
beliefs.  In 2004, a board member was contacted and had discussions with a lawyer affiliated 
with the Discovery Institute, which, as previously mentioned, was a dedicated proponent of ID.  
The board arranged to have the science teachers watch a video sent to it by the Discovery 
Institute, and allowed lawyers from the Institute to make a legal presentation to the board about 
the merits of ID.201  During this time, the board was delaying its purchase of the new biology 
textbook recommended by the science advisory committee, of which science teachers were part.  
The book the teachers recommended contained information on evolution, and made no mention 
of any alternative theories.  The board delayed because it was looking into purchasing a book 
that included a balance of evolution and creationism.202  Many board members stated their 
preference for such a balanced treatment book.  One member went so far as to say “this country 
was founded on Christianity and our students should be taught as such.”203 It was during this 
time that members of the public spoke at the board meetings, and argued that the Genesis version 
of creationism should be taught in the school.204  At a board meeting, a board member distributed 
a pamphlet outlining views on the origins of life.  This pamphlet included information on the 
“Intelligent Design Movement,” credited to Phillip Johnson and Michael Behe, which was listed 
under the heading “Old Earth Creation.”205   
 Later that year a group of board members blocked the purchase of the faculty 
recommended biology book unless the board also voted to purchase the ID textbook Of Pandas 
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and People, to be used as companion texts to the biology book.206  The teachers feared not 
getting any biology book at all, and agreed to the purchase of Pandas.  Amazingly enough, a 
Board member arranged for 60 copies of Pandas to be bought by his church, with money that 
was donated from the congregation and were subsequently given to the school.207  The company 
from whom the books were bought listed Pandas under “Creation Science.”  After the purchase 
the board passed the disclaimer at issue in this case, and amended its science curriculum without 
following many of its normal procedures.208  The policy was adopted without any discussion 
among the board members as to how it could or would improve science education.  The board 
gave no justification for the curriculum change.209  In fact, several of the board members who 
voted for the curriculum change testified that they had utterly no grasp of what ID was.  The 
superintendent’s entire understanding of the issue of ID was that “evolution has a design.”210  As 
noted, the science teachers refused to read the disclaimer, for fear that students would believe 
that “intelligent design is a valid scientific theory, perhaps on par with the theory of 
evolution.”211 
 The board’s stated purpose in enacting the policy was to improve science education and 
to exercise students’ critical thinking skills.  However, given the laundry list of legislative history 
and context, the court found that the board’s stated purpose was a sham, and that its real purpose 
was to promote religion.212  Had the board truly been interested in improving education, they 
would have consulted scientific materials, organizations, or even paid heed to the views of their 
science teachers.213  Instead of relying on scientific experts, the board relied only on legal advice 
from the Discovery Institute, an organization which the court found to have demonstrably 
religious, cultural and legal missions, not grounded in science.  The board’s stated goal of 
improving science education was belied by the fact that most of the board who voted in favor of 
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the curriculum change conceded they did not know precisely what ID is, nor how it could 
improve science education.214  Thus, the secular purposes claimed by the board were found to be 
a pretext for its real purpose of promoting religion in the public school classroom, which violates 
the Establishment Clause.215 
 Although the court found that the district’s actions failed the purpose prong of Lemon, it 
continued on to analyze the policy under the effects prong as well.216  The court stated that while 
it treats the Lemon and endorsement tests separately, the effects prong of Lemon covers largely 
the same ground as the endorsement test, so the court incorporated its findings of fact and legal 
conclusions made under its endorsement analysis into the effects prong analysis.217  The effects 
prong of Lemon asks whether the effect of the enactment would be government endorsement of 
religion, and uses the endorsement principle of what the reasonable, objective observer would 
perceive to answer that question.218  The court reiterated its findings that a reasonable observer 
would know that ID is not science, and that the only real effect of the ID policy would be the 
advancement of religion.  The court also found that the disclaimer has the effect of bolstering 
alternative religious theories by suggesting that evolution is a problematic theory.219  The court 
further found that reading the disclaimer disavowed endorsement of valid evolutionary 
educational materials and juxtaposed that disavowal with an urging to contemplate alternative 
religious concepts, which implied the school board approved of a religious principle.  Therefore, 
the effect of the board’s actions was to impose a religious view of biological origins into the 
biology course, in violation of the Establishment Clause.220 
 The court in Kitzmiller went to great lengths to show that the ID policy could not pass 
muster under any part of either test which applied.  It also took great pains to find that ID was 
both a religious theory and not a scientific one.  Once those two things were determined, it was 
 31
possible to find that the district had endorsed religion, had no secular purpose and had the 
primary effect of advancing religion.  The next questions to ask are whether the court correctly 
applied the tests it did, and whether or not there can be a set of circumstances under which ID 
might be taught that does not violate the Establishment Clause. 
 
IV. Can ID Survive Establishment Clause Scrutiny? 
 The first step in this inquiry will be to determine which tests a court could and would 
apply.  It has been pointed out that the Lemon test has been criticized by three current justices, as 
inadequate or inappropriate for Establishment Clause analysis.221  With two new members on the 
Supreme Court who have not yet ruled on an Establishment Clause case, the argument can be 
made that with the three who currently disapprove of Lemon, there is the possibility that a 
majority of the Court could overturn the Lemon test.222  However, the Supreme Court has 
applied the Lemon test in many public school Establishment Clause cases, and recently declined 
to abandon the test.223  And until it is overturned, it must be assumed that it is still good law, and 
that courts will continue to apply it.  Additionally, Lemon does has precedential value in this 
particular context, as it was last used to determine a religion/evolution clash in public school 
science curriculum in Edwards.224   
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has not used the endorsement test in regards to 
religion in the public school science curriculum, but as was noted by the court in Kitzmiller, the 
Supreme Court has consistently applied Endorsement in the public school setting.225  The 
Supreme Court stated in 2000 that “[i]n cases involving state participation in a religious activity, 
one of the relevant questions to ask is ‘whether an objective observer . . . would perceive it as 
state endorsement of religion.”226  That case was about prayer at a public school sponsored event, 
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so the Court has been willing to use the endorsement test in public school cases.  It might be 
argued that of the two tests, when not used in tandem, endorsement is more favored.   Evidence 
of endorsement’s preferred status came in 2005, when the Court held that endorsement principles 
could also be used to find perceived government purpose as well as perceived effects for which it 
had previously been used.227   
When analyzing Establishment Clause issues in public schools, the key questions the 
Court has asked are whether there is a secular government purpose for the enactment, and what 
the effect of the enactment is.228 Whether a court uses actual purpose and effect, as in Lemon, or 
perceived purpose and effect, as in endorsement, the critical questions remain the same.  The 
method a court would use to get the answers varies, but if a court is looking for government 
purpose and effect, the natural choices seem to be Lemon and endorsement. 
Whether the Court would use the two tests separately as the Kitzmiller court did, or use a 
combination of both remains to be seen, but for purposes of this paper, it would be prudent to 
analyze ID under both tests. 
A. Lemon’s Purpose Prong 
 In invalidating the statute in question in Edwards, the Court took a multiple step 
approach.  First, the Court concluded that the purpose articulated, namely academic freedom, 
was not actually furthered by the statute, and so could not be its actual purpose.229  Once it was 
determined that the articulated purpose could not be the actual purpose, the Court set out to 
determine what the actual purpose was.230  If the actual purpose was to advance religion, it would 
be struck down.231   
In order for an enactment to have the primary purpose of advancing religion, it must both 
be religious in and of itself and have no scientific value in its own right.  We know this because 
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if a challenged pedagogy is not religious, then there is no need to analyze it under the 
Establishment Clause.  If it is not religious then, as the Court has repeatedly stated, it will give 
great deference to day-to-day school choices unless they implicate the First Amendment.232  The 
Court has more than once stressed that authority for running public schools is left to the states, 
but that protecting constitutional rights in public schools is “vital.”233  But no such constitutional 
rights are implicated if a pedagogy is not religious, and so would likely be given deference by a 
court as a rational curriculum choice. 
The Court has also stated that teaching multiple scientific theories might be validly done 
if there was a valid secular purpose.234  If a certain pedagogy is considered to be validly 
scientific, then it seems self-evident that its purpose would be to enhance the science curriculum 
and be found to be validly secular, and so it would not matter that it coincides with certain 
religious beliefs.  If it is validly scientific, the secular purpose of enhancing science education 
will be enough to pass the purpose prong, even though the pedagogy might embrace certain 
religious tenets.  So, the question becomes twofold: whether an ID policy could be considered to 
be not religious, thus removing it from Establishment Clause scrutiny; or can ID be deemed a 
scientific theory, thus bestowing it with the valid secular purpose of improving science 
education.  It is worth noting that the court in Edwards relied almost exclusively on legislative 
history in making those determinations about the challenged acts in that case.235   
 The first question to be answered then is: can ID ever be considered not to be religious?  
As was previously said, the Court in Edwards relied almost exclusively on the legislative history 
to find that creation science embodied a religious principle.  It found this from the statements 
made by legislators, and the experts they relied on, that made it clear that the legislature intended 
for creation science to encompass the religious concept of creation ex nihilo.236  The legislature 
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intended that “creation science” be taught, and understood that term to include the belief that 
man was created from nothing, which is an inherently religious concept.  So, in effect, the 
legislature intended for religion to be taught in the public school science curricula when it 
mandated the teaching of creation science, regardless of whatever else was meant by that term. 
In Kitzmiller, under the purpose prong, the court considered the policy’s language, context and 
contemporaneous legislative history.237  The court considered evidence of historical context, 
specific sequence of events leading up to passage, departures form normal procedures, and 
contemporaneous statements from the legislative sponsor as part of the analysis of legislative 
history.238  Through legislative history, the court found that the board understood ID to be a 
religious theory and thought of ID as a way to get religious content into the science curriculum.  
In both cases, the governmental unit made it clear through its actions that its intent was to inject 
religious principles into the science class.239   
However, legislative history may not always be fatal.  The problem with relying on 
legislative history is that it can be manipulated if a legislative body is able to conceal its 
motives.240  The statements of the legislators in Edwards were fairly blatant in their assertions 
that they had a religious motivation.  The leading expert came right out and said “the theory of 
creation science included belief in the existence of supernatural causes.”  And, it is hard to 
imagine a worse case for testing ID, from a pro-ID standpoint, than that in Kitzmiller.  The 
school board there made about so many mistakes as it possibly could and made it clear they were 
religiously motivated.  It had a church buy its ID books, consulted with Discovery Institute 
lawyers, made it clear it was delaying the purchase of a biology book because it included 
evolution, disparaged evolution on religious grounds during school board meetings, a board 
member burned an evolution mural, the list goes on and on.   
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However, this does not need to be the case.  If a school board wanted to implement an ID 
policy, and even if it wanted to do so for improper religious reasons, it would not be that difficult 
to create a much “cleaner,” yet more deceptive legislative history.  Simply avoiding saying and 
doing things like the board in Kitzmiller would be a good start.  Of the factors courts will look to 
to determine legislative intent, a school board or government entity can control contemporaneous 
statements of the legislative sponsor, statements by any board member generally, and departures 
from normal procedure.  If it is careful to avoid casting the debate in religious terms, or betraying 
personal feelings favorable toward or creationism or against evolution, and follows normal 
procedure in adoption, a government entity could go a long way toward tipping the balance away 
from religious purpose. The sequence of events leading up to passage is somewhat out of the 
control of a governmental entity, but if it avoids inflaming the public and keeps a low profile, it 
may be able to exert some form of control. 
 However, a government entity will not be able to control the historical context of such a 
policy.  If a court can establish a link to the past historical conflict between certain 
fundamentalist Christian beliefs and the teaching of evolution, there may not be much that a 
government entity could do.  The courts in Epperson, Edwards, McLean and Kitzmiller all found 
such a link between the statutes at issue in those cases and the historical conflict between certain 
religious groups and evolution.  The courts in those cases were willing to impute the historical 
religious animus to evolution to the governmental entities because of the statements and actions 
of those entities.  However, if a board were to keep itself from using religious arguments against 
teaching evolution, and to keep any religious objections to itself, there is no real reason why a 
court should infer those same religious motives to it as plagued other governmental entities.241   
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One problem with historical context, however, is that a government entity has no control 
over how ID came to be.  In Kitzmiller, the court went to great lengths to point out that ID was 
simply a recasting of creationism using different terminology.242  Creationism was found to be 
inherently religious, and could not escape its religious roots, no matter how the government tried 
to clothe it in scientific terms.243  Those findings are now precedent only in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, but there is nothing to say other courts will not follow its lead, as the Supreme 
Court did when it adopted reasoning from McLean.244  If that is so, it will be hard for ID to 
escape from the religious pall Kitzmiller cast over it.  Between the inherently religious 
statements, the numerous admissions and concessions offered up in court by ID experts, the post-
Edwards revision of Pandas, and especially the implications of the Wedge Document, there may 
be little any government entity can do to escape ID’s characterization as religious.  The Wedge 
Document is especially damning, simply because of the prominent role the Discovery Institute 
played in the development of ID.245  In one fell swoop, pretty much every plausible argument for 
why ID can stand alone and is not tied to religion, went out the window when the Wedge 
Document’s 5-year plan for overthrowing Darwinism was exposed.246  Still, could historical 
context alone show religious purpose, if a government entity did everything else it could to avoid 
a religious purpose?  The court in Kitzmiller found that the historical character of ID was a 
proper subject of review, and such character was relied on as dispositive in McLean.247  It seems 
doubtful that ID could escape its lineage when courts are willing to look to historical context and 
ID has many established ties to creationism.  And, in any case, given courts avowed sensitivity to 
religion in the public school setting, it seems likely a court would be willing to delve into 
historical context.248  If a court were to examine ID’s historical context, finding its religious 
nature will depend on what experts are called.  But the court in Kitzmiller had a wealth of 
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evidence linking ID to creationism, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where similar testimony 
could not be produced.249 
 What’s more, even if an ID policy could be divorced from any creationist roots, and a 
government entity could avoid showing religious intent, it seems fairly unlikely any ID policy 
could be considered not religious for two reasons.  First of all, the court in Kitzmiller found that 
when examining the challenged ID policy, it would be required to consider of the policy’s 
legislative history and historical context to determine what is meant by the term ID.250  If ID is in 
and of itself an inherently religious theory, then it will receive scrutiny under the Estalishment 
Clause regardless of any historical predecessors.251  Though ID claims to eschew religion, the 
court in Kitzmiller found that the theory depended on the presence of a supernatural designer, 
which makes it a religious proposition according to McLean and Edwards.252  ID proponents 
argue ID cannot be religious because it does not define who or what the designer is.253  By a 
quite literal definition, ID does not state that the designer is supernatural.  It makes no claims as 
to the identity of the designer, natural or otherwise.254  But, one of the tenets embraced by ID is 
that natural processes such as evolution cannot account for the complex life forms we see 
today.255  At some point, ID demands the designer act outside the laws of nature to generate 
irreducibly complex biological systems, which ID proponents argue could not have arisen from 
any natural process.256  If natural processes cannot explain the designer, and it works outside the 
realm of natural laws, by definition this must be supernatural.257  In examining the historical 
context in which ID arose, a court will almost certainly be able to ascertain that it depends upon 
a supernatural designer, and that therefore ID is precluded by its own tenets from claiming it is 
not a religious belief.258 
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 So, it seems unlikely that ID could be considered not religious, but that alone does not 
preclude it from being constitutional under the Establishment Clause when taught in a public 
school science classroom.  If ID can be considered science, then it has a valid, clear secular 
purpose: improving science education.  The purpose need not be exclusively secular, so long as 
the policy is not entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion.259  In Edwards, the 
Supreme Court did not define either “religion” or “science.”  However, in terms of religion, the 
Court made analysis much easier by holding that, if nothing else, belief in a supernatural creator 
is a religious concept, which obviated the need to define it totally.260  Unfortunately, the court 
declined to offer up even such a partial definition for science in the opinion.  It declined to 
review any evidence the government had that suggested creation-science was in fact valid 
science because it did not need to do so in order to resolve the case.261  So the question then 
becomes how do we define science?  The answer to that question will be important; if ID is valid 
science, it has a secular purpose, and could be constitutionally taught in public school science 
curricula.262 
 The court in McLean took it upon itself to define science, at least for its purposes in 
resolving that case.263  Based upon expert testimony, the court came up with a five part definition 
of the essential characteristics of science.264  The court in Kitzmiller also defined science’s 
“ground rules,” based on expert testimony.265  The definition used in McLean and the definition 
used in Kitzmiller share certain attributes.  Both conclude that science is limited to the search for 
natural causes to explain natural events, that testability is an essential feature, as is compiling 
empirical data that is testable, replicable, and observable.266  Both definitions stress the 
importance acceptance in the scientific community and of the peer-review process in weeding 
out bad science from good.  The definition both courts came up with have much in common with 
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each other, and would very likely be accepted by the majority of the scientific community, as far 
as they go.267  However, these ad hoc, case by case definitions can be problematic.  For one, 
judges cannot be expected to be scientific experts, yet courts will need to examine the validity of 
pseudoscientific claims, especially in the context of religious challenges to science curricula.268  
Another problem will be consistency; depending on what experts one calls, one will get slightly 
differing definitions.  There may not there be one monolithic definition that can encompass what 
science truly means, but the subtle differences that could arise could lead to differing results, and 
a theory like ID  might be slippery enough to slip through a crack. 
 It is with those concerns in mind that I address the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
Daubert test.269  This was a case interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, but in so doing the 
Court formulated a rule for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony.  The Court stated that 
it is the judge who has a general gate keeping function, which means he or she must ensure that 
any potential scientific expert testimony must be based on scientific knowledge and to determine 
whether such testimony will assist the trier of fact (reliability and relevance).270  For the purposes 
of this paper, we are interested in only the reliability portion of the test.  The Daubert case 
defined what can be “scientific knowledge” upon which experts may base their testimony.   
The Court found four factors to consider when determining if an expert’s testimony is 
based on scientific knowledge. The court will look to the method the expert used in order to 
come to his or her conclusions.271  The first factor the Court identified was whether or not the 
method used can be or has been tested.  In explaining the factor the Court elaborated that 
“scientific methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they 
can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of 
human inquiry.”272   The Court also stated that “the statements constituting a scientific test must 
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be capable of empirical test.” 273  So, the first factor involves whether or not a method can be 
empirically tested and through testing be proven false.  Secondly, the Court found that whether 
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer- review and publication was a relevant 
consideration.274  The Court went on to note that publication is not necessarily indicative of good 
science, but that submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of “good 
science,” in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be 
detected.275  Third, the Court pointed out that it should consider the known rate of error, and the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.276  This reflected 
the Court’s concern with reliability; if the method too often yields differing or incorrect results, 
or is not applied the same way every time, it may not constitute scientific knowledge.  And 
fourth, the Court found that “general acceptance” can have a bearing on the inquiry.277  The 
Court stated “[a] known technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within 
the community may properly be viewed with skepticism.”278  This factor relates to, but is not the 
same as peer review.  General acceptance reflects whether or not a given method has gained 
recognition as acceptable science within the relevant scientific community.  However, the Court 
went on to note that the standard was a flexible one; the list of four factors is not exhaustive, and 
none of the four are necessary to find admissibility.279 
 This reliability standard is only used to determine admissibility of scientific expert 
testimony, but I think it could easily be adapted for Establishment Clause purposes.  The 
question the Daubert test seeks to answer is whether or not expert scientific testimony is 
admissible.  That question is answered by examining if the methods used to create that expert 
testimony are scientifically valid.  And that is precisely the question facing courts in ID cases: 
whether or not the methodology used to create ID principles and hypotheses are scientifically 
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valid.  It is important to note that the Daubert test emphasizes the need for naturalism, 
empirically verifiable data, and peer review.280  Many of those criteria were incorporated into the 
definitions of science reached by the courts in McLean and Kitzmiller.  The Daubert test would 
seem to be a ready-made method to determine the scientific validity of ID that was so vital in 
Kitzmiller.281     
If the Daubert test had been used in Kitzmiller, would ID still have failed as valid 
science?  It seems likely that it would.  ID would not be able to satisfy the first Daubert factor.  
ID’s hypothesis that an intelligent designer created complex life cannot be tested and cannot be 
falsified.282  Because the designer works outside of natural processes, we cannot replicate what it 
has done, and we cannot naturally observe any act of creation.  By removing creation from the 
realm of the naturally observable, ID cannot claim a methodology that is testable and 
falsifiable.283  Furthermore, there has been very little ID theory that has been subject to peer 
review.284  And even if ID hypotheses are subjected to peer review, they cannot be subject to the 
scrutiny of the scientific community, because they cannot be proven wrong.  Likewise, there is 
no known rate of error for a court to look at, simply because there is no way of proving whether 
ID is right or wrong.  Because we cannot observe or replicate this act of creation, there is no way 
of knowing whether it consistent.  And finally, ID has failed to win the acceptance of any 
sizeable portion of the scientific community.285  Although ID proponents claim that ID is a 
growing theory that is continually gaining support, it is clear that it is a minority position, and 
that the vast majority of scientists support evolution.286  ID proponents claim this hostility toward 
ID arises from their commitment to the scientific method, which ID threatens.287  This argument 
will be addressed below, but for now it is enough to note that even if such bias exists, ID would 
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still fail two of four of the recommended criteria. Under Daubert, it seems unlikely that ID would 
be considered valid science.288 
 In any case, the Supreme Court has avoided defining science in its Establishment Clause 
cases, but with ID sure to be tried again, perhaps it will have to.  If it does, the Daubert test will 
be a waiting as a tried and accepted method of defining science.   
 ID failed to be classified as science under the test articulated in Kitzmiller, and would 
likely fail if analyzed under Daubert as well.  This is not the end of ID’s claims of scienctific 
validity, however.  ID proponents accepted that their theory did not fit the definition of science 
used in Kitzmiller, but they continue to argue that science needs to be redefined to include the 
study of supernatural phenomena.289  One of the principle spokesmen of this epistemological 
argument is Francis Beckwith.  He discusses science’s supposed commitment to methodological 
naturalism – MN - (i.e. the scientific method, including limiting science to postulating natural 
causation) which has caused mainstream science to dismiss ID without cause.290  ID cannot be 
reconciled with MN, as it cannot be explained by reference to natural causes.  He feels that MN 
is only a philosophical presupposition of science, not a defining characteristic of science.  In 
other words, the scientific community’s adherence to natural causation is not a necessary 
component of scientific inquiry, only an interpretative filter we have placed on science.291  To 
Beckwith, “if the arguments for ID are reasonable and the resulting conclusions sound (even if 
they conflict with MN), we may conclude that MN is not a necessary precondition of natural 
science” and can include supernatural causes in the study of science.292   
This argument is flawed for a few reasons.  Science does not claim that events can have 
only natural causes, but that the only causes we can understand scientifically are natural ones.  
Supernatural causes are beyond the laws of nature, and thus beyond the scope of science.293  
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Science is a self-contained paradigm that has its own rules, and whose properties obey those 
rules.  But nothing about science says those rules are universal truths.  It is merely one way of 
looking at the world.294   
Secondly, Beckwith makes the assumption that if ID arguments are reasonable, and its 
conclusions sound, then it should be part of science.295  The problem is he has not shown the 
arguments for ID are reasonable.  How can he, when we have no way of knowing whether he is 
correct?  He has proposed a supernatural cause, but we cannot study it, and we have no way of 
knowing if the conclusions are sound because we cannot test them.  As one scientist makes clear, 
“supernatural explanations fail to account for natural phenomena in ways that are intellectually 
useful.”296   Once a supernatural being has been credited with creation, the inquiry must stop, 
because we have no way to study that being.  To put it another way,  “to appeal to magical 
thinking merely shifts the relevant question a little farther out of reach.”297  While this 
epistemological debate is interesting, and while there very well may be other, better ways to 
know things, in the end including supernatural causes in science just does not fit the definition of 
science. 
 As was said, a methodological debate is interesting, but in the end, a court will need an 
objective definition of science to apply, whether garnered from McLean or Kitzmiller as 
precedent, borrowed or modified from Daubert, or gathered by a court from its own expert 
witnesses.  And, that definition will almost certainly not include supernatural causation, and that 
likely means ID cannot be considered science.  Since an ID policy will likely be found to be 
religious, and not be scientific, it is hard to see how it could pass the purpose prong of Lemon. 
 However, it has been shown that courts sometimes will not strike down laws based on the 
purpose prong.298  And in one recent case, a lower court found that a policy challenging 
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evolution did in fact pass the purpose prong.  In Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of 
Education, the school board mandated that a disclaimer be read that stated that the teaching of 
evolution was not intended to dissuade students from believing in the biblical version of 
creation.299  The board asserted three purposes for the disclaimer, to promote freedom of belief; 
to disclaim any orthodoxy of belief that could be inferred from exclusive placement of evolution 
in the curriculum; and to reduce offense to the sensibilities of parents and students caused by the 
teaching of evolution.300  The court found that the disclaimer passed the purpose prong because 
the disclaimer did in fact further the two purposes of disclaiming the inference of the orthodoxy 
of evolution, and did reduce the offense to parents and teachers.301  The court further held that 
these two purposes promoted the valid secular goal of accommodation of religion.302  Since the 
stated purposes were secular and the disclaimer did further those goals, it passed the purpose 
prong.303  The court so held, despite finding that the purpose of protecting freedom of belief was 
a sham, and stating that “we find that the disclaimer on the whole furthers a contrary purpose, 
namely the protection and maintenance of a particular religious viewpoint.”304  It is worthwhile 
to note however, that the court did go on to find the disclaimer to violate the effects prong of 
Lemon.305   
 Regardless of whether one thinks that protecting the feelings of students who 
believe in biblical creation or disclaiming an orthodoxy of belief in evolution are valid secular 
goals, the relevant question for purposes of this paper is can such an approach allow an ID policy 
pass the purpose prong of Lemon?  It will depend upon the stated purpose given by the 
legislative body.  Thus far, I have assumed that the asserted purpose for an ID policy would be to 
strengthen the science curriculum.  Whether that purpose is a sham depends on whether ID can 
be categorized as science, which seems unlikely.  So, what if the stated purpose for an ID policy 
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were changed to include disclaiming the inference of the orthodoxy of evolution and to 
accommodate the feelings of students and parents whose religious beliefs clash with the teaching 
of evolution?  First, while accommodation of the feelings of religious believers might be a valid 
secular goal, there will come a point where government accommodation of religion will be 
perceived as endorsement of religion.306  When accommodation reaches that point, it will 
become a violation of the Establishment Clause.  The court in Kitzmiller found ID to be an 
inherently religious theory because it embraced the religious belief of a supernatural creator.307  
If a future court were to likewise find that ID is a religious theory, the question will be whether 
or not a reasonable observer would perceive the teaching of that religious theory in a public 
school science class as government endorsement of religion.  The answer seems self-evident.  If 
a school were to single out a single religious belief to be taught, a reasonable observer would 
likely see government endorsement of that particular belief over other religious beliefs.  If the 
school wished to accommodate religion without endorsing any one in particular, it would have to 
present multiple views about the origins of life, not just the one presented by ID.  If a court were 
to find that ID is not an inherently religious theory, then it seems obvious that teaching ID does 
not further the goal of accommodating religion.  So regardless of whether or not ID is considered 
a religious theory, accommodating religious beliefs will likely not be a valid secular purpose.  
Furthermore, even if sparing the feelings of religious adherents was a valid secular goal, there is 
no way to judge whether an ID policy would in fact reduce the offense a child or parent would 
feel.  They may be just as offended by ID as by evolution.  There is no accurate way to judge if 
an ID policy would in fact further the goal of reducing offense at being exposed the theory of 
evolution.  If a student or parent is offended by the teaching of evolution, it is difficult to see 
how teaching an alternative theory would alleviate those feelings.  Evolution would still be 
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taught, and the student or parent would still be offended.  If a school truly wanted to alleviate 
mental anguish on the parts of students and parents over having to learn evolution, then the 
simplest course of action would be to not teach evolution.  However, that is not an option after 
the Court decided Epperson.308 
Presenting an alternative theory like ID would surely advance the purpose of disclaiming 
the orthodoxy of evolution.  The question is whether or not such a disclaimer is a valid secular 
purpose.  Such a disclaimer is in effect telling school children that the school will be teaching 
them evolution, but that they should be aware that other theories on the origin of life exist.  What 
secular reasons could a school have for such a statement?  The purpose of alerting children to 
alternate theories can only be to encourage them to think critically about evolution, and thus 
improve science education, or to encourage them to seek out those alternative theories.  If that is 
so, then presenting ID as such an alternative theory would only further the purpose of improving 
science education if it were found to be validly scientific.  As discussed above, it seems unlikely 
that ID could be validly scientific, and therefore cannot further the goal of advancing science 
education.   
 Having examined the purpose prong of Lemon from different angles, it seems that while 
a legislative body might be able to increase their odds, or make it harder for a court to find a lack 
of secular purpose, ID is unlikely to pass muster under the first prong of Lemon.  So long as a 
court will be able to determine that ID is not a scientific theory, but a religious one, I do not 
believe an ID policy can pass the purpose prong of Lemon. 
B. Lemon’s Effects Prong 
 If by some chance an ID policy passes the purpose prong of Lemon, the next step is to 
analyze such a policy under the effects prong.309  The Court never addressed the effects test in 
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Edwards, but the court in Kitzmiller did, and found that the test had the “animating requirement 
that . . . [an official act’s] principle or primary effect . . . be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.”  The court went on to note that government may not place its prestige, coercive 
authority, or resources behind a single religious faith or behind religious faith in general. The 
government cannot convey to adherents of the religious view espoused that they are insiders in 
society and are politically favored, nor can it convey to non-adherents that they are outsiders, and 
politically disfavored. The court in Kitzmiller also noted that the Lemon effects test covers 
mostly the same criteria as the endorsement test, and as such primarily relied on its findings of 
law and fact expounded in its endorsement analysis.  As noted above, the endorsement test is 
applied frequently to Establishment Clause cases, and seems to be becoming more and more 
standard as time goes on. In more recent cases like Kitzmiller and Freiler, courts have 
consistently interpreted the effects prong to entail using endorsement principles to determine 
primary effect in religion and public school science curricula issues.  One court stated “[i]n 
assessing the primary effect of the contested [act,] we focus on the message conveyed by the 
[act] to the students who are its intended audience.”310  Because the effects prong of Lemon asks 
what a reasonable, objective observer would perceive the effect of the government action to be, 
whether or not an ID policy could pass the effects prong will be analyzed with the endorsement 
test below.311  
C. Endorsement 
The endorsement test was used to determine the constitutionality of ID in Kitzmiller, and 
would likely be used again.  As stated above, the effects prong of Lemon incorporates 
endorsement principles, and the endorsement test is worth analyzing on those grounds alone. 
However, the Supreme Court has used the endorsement test in all manner of public school cases 
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that implicate religion.312 The court in Kitzmiller declared that, based on Supreme Court 
precedent, the endorsement test “must be utilized.”313  
The endorsement test asks whether a reasonable, objective observer would perceive 
government endorsement of religion based on its actions.  Courts will presume the observer is 
familiar with “the policy’s language, origins, legislative history, as well as the history of the 
community and the broader social and historical context in which the policy arose,” in 
determining what the observer would perceive.314  The observer will be a member of the class 
which the government action is meant to reach. 
 First of all, it is important to note that the factors that are proper for consideration under 
endorsement mirror the factors a court may analyze in attempting to find legislative purpose 
under Lemon in many respects; namely the consideration of the policy’s language, legislative 
history and historical context.315  The only difference in these regards is who is doing the 
consideration.  Under Lemon, it is the court and under endorsement it will be a hypothetical 
observer.  The question becomes what can a judge discover from language, legislative history 
and historical context that a reasonable observer cannot, if anything?  In other words, does the 
reasonable observer’s knowledge go as deep as a court’s would be?  One scholar has said that 
“throughout the reasonable observer’s existence in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, there is 
little the reasonable observer has been presumed not to know about social practices or legal 
requirements.”316  The court in Kitzmiller stated the “objective observer thus considers the 
publicly available evidence . . . to ascertain whether the policy ‘in fact conveys a message of 
endorsement or disapproval’ of religion, irrespective of what the government might have 
intended.”317   
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 In determining whether or not an ID policy can survive the endorsement test, the 
objective, reasonable observer must first be identified.  Using a hypothetical ID policy, the 
intended audience will be the students to whom ID would be taught.  Therefore that observer 
must “interpret the challenged conduct . . . with the level of intellectual sophistication that a child 
of the relevant age would bring to bear.”318  Any analysis under the endorsement test will be fact 
specific, so for the purposes of this paper it will be assumed that this hypothetical school district 
has enacted a policy that allows ID to be taught in the science curriculum.  It will also be 
assumed that the district has acted appropriately whenever it could in not overtly endorsing 
religion.  This means it has not made statements disparaging evolution or the like, and has acted 
within the bounds of its normal procedure for adopting curricula.  Much like the analysis 
employed above under the purpose prong of Lemon, there will be things the district can control, 
and some it cannot.  It can control the language and origins of the policy, and legislative history, 
but not how the policy will be perceived by the reasonable high school observer.  The simplest 
way try to avoid conveying a message of endorsement is to keep the language of such a policy as 
neutral as possible, and keep any kind of comments about creationism or religious motivation out 
of the legislative record.319   
 However, because this is the endorsement test, the focus will be on how the observer 
interprets the actions of the school district.  And since the observer will be presumed to know the 
historical context in which ID arose, and have a working knowledge of what ID entails, it is hard 
to see how the observer would not perceive endorsement.  As has been laid out above, one who 
is familiar with ID would be presumed to know the religious purpose many of the initial 
proponents of ID held.320  Also included in this historical context would be such things as the 
Wedge Document, created by the Discovery Institute which is one of the main ideological forces 
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behind ID.321  If the observer is familiar with the Wedge Document, it is hard to envision he or 
she would not perceive ID to be endorsing religion.   
Not only is there such evidence in the historical context, but the observer will also be 
presumed to be familiar with exactly what it is ID tries to teach because he or she will be taught 
those ideas.  And as has been stated, one who knows that ID presupposes an intelligent designer 
will be able to recognize that the existence of a designer is tantamount to a supreme creator, 
which the observer would know is an inherently religious concept.     
Because the objective observer would be familiar with the historical context in which ID 
arose, and would be familiar with the teachings of ID, he or she would know that ID relies on 
faulty science, and contains religious arguments.  Armed with this knowledge, it seems likely 
that the observer would perceive the government to be conveying a message of endorsement for 
no valid secular reason. Again, ID cannot be defined as science, and it contains an inherently 
religious concept, which a reasonable observer would know.  Knowing those two things, it is 
hard to see how any objective observer would fail to see government is sending the message that 
it is preferring religion to non-religion. 
The reasoning above is essentially the same as the court in Kitzmiller used to find 
endorsement in that case.322  The observer’s level of knowledge of the historical context in which 
ID arose was a key part of the court’s finding of endorsement.  However, it is fair to ask if the 
reasonable, objective high school student would have the level of knowledge the court imputes to 
him or her.  How familiar would such a student be with the historical context in which ID arose?  
Would he or she know about the religious motivations of some of the founders of ID?  Could a 
high school student reasonably be believed to be familiar with the Wedge Document?  In Santa 
Fe, the U.S. Supreme Court used a reasonable, objective high school student to determine that 
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the school’s policy regarding prayer at a football game would be perceived as endorsement.323  In 
that case, the Court examined the perspective of the reasonable student in regard to the text and 
history of the policy, and delivery of the prayer.324  Exactly how much the student can be 
presumed to know will depend on how liberally a court interprets the phrase “historical context 
in which the policy arose.”  If it is interpreted to mean the observer will only be familiar with the 
context of the policy, then such knowledge could not extend beyond the time the government 
entity submitted, debated and passed the policy.  If that is the case, then there is no way the 
student could know about the Wedge Document, or about the early religious biases of some of 
ID’s proponents; provided the hypothetical school district did not discuss ID’s religious roots or 
contact the Discovery Institute while implementing its policy. 
 However, there is evidence to suggest that a more liberal interpretation should be given 
to what the observer would know.  Justice O’Connor, the architect of the endorsement test has 
stated that the reasonable observer is “fully cognizant of the history, ubiquity, and the context of 
the practice in question.”325 One who is fully cognizant of the history and context of teaching ID 
could reasonably know about the origins of ID, and the religious mission of the Discovery 
Institute.   If a reasonable student is aware of the history of ID, then presumably he or she will be 
aware of the first major legal test for ID, Kitzmiller, in which ID was found to be religious.326  In 
any case, the reasonable observer is more knowledgeable than the average class member, and 
seems to be getting more knowledgeable all the time.  As one scholar put it, “[t]he overall trend . 
. . has been to pack more awareness of relevant factors into the reasonable person.”327  Another 
author has stated that “today’s reasonable observer is a veritable Jeopardy! champion.”328  Given 
this trend, it does not seem farfetched to impute detailed knowledge of ID’s historical context to 
the reasonable student.   
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And, even if such historical knowledge was denied to the student, he or she would be 
familiar with ID itself, because he or she would be taught it in school.  If that is the case, then he 
or she would be familiar with ID’s core premise of an intelligent designer.329  Presumably the 
student, game show champion or no, would be able to determine that an intelligent designer is 
equivalent to a supernatural being, which is inherently religious.330  If the student knows ID 
depends on an inherently religious principle, he or she would likely be able to perceive 
endorsement, whether they are familiar with ID’s roots or not. 
No matter the reasonable student’s level of knowledge, the fact that he or she will be 
taught ID will be enough for him or her to recognize ID’s inherent religiosity.  If that is the case, 
a court will likely have little trouble determining that an ID policy is an impermissible 
endorsement of religion. 
V.  Alternatives to ID in the Science Curriculum 
 After thorough analysis, it seems ID cannot escape from being labeled religious and not 
science.  The combination of the two factors seems to preclude ID from being included in a 
public school science curriculum.  However, if the goals of ID proponents are to simply get ID 
into the schools, and criticize evolutionary theory, there may yet be avenues open to them.   
 Even though ID will likely be considered to contain a religious tenet does not mean it can 
never be taught in public schools.  The Court has noted that not all subjects which touch upon 
religion are banned from the classroom, and that study of religious works can be educationally 
valuable, if not invaluable.331  It would be entirely possible to get ID taught in a public school 
classroom.  A religious idea may be taught in public school classrooms, so long as it is not 
presented as truth, it is presented in a way so as not to favor it, and there are no attempts at 
proselytizing.332  The idea would also have to be studied in an elective course such as philosophy 
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or comparative religion.333  This is not the same as getting ID in the science classroom, and 
would signal an admittance that ID is not science, but at this stage, this is perhaps the best ID can 
hope for.334   
 A second strategy would be to remove any mention of ID or a designer from a disclaimer 
like the one at issue in Kitzmiller.335  Again, this is tantamount to admitting that ID is not 
science, and does not get ID into schoolrooms, but it will have the secondary benefit of attacking 
evolution, which is part of ID’s focus.336  This could be allowed, as the court in Edwards stated 
that it “[did] not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing 
theories be taught.”337  However, it should be noted that courts are wary of any policy that 
singles out evolution for scrutiny.338  So long as the government entity has not made it clear 
through its actions that its purpose is to denigrate evolution because it clashes with their religious 
beliefs, it should stand up, as it has the valid secular purposes of promoting critical thinking and 
improving science education by presenting scientific evidence.   
 The combination of offering ID as part of an elective course in philosophy or 
comparative religion and using valid scientific critiques of evolution in the science curriculum 
will likely be as close to accomplishing their goals as ID advocates can get without violating the 
Constitution.  It is not what they would prefer, I am sure. 
V.Conclusion 
 Intelligent Design is the latest theory to be used in a long line of attempts to replace, 
qualify or supplement the teaching of the theory of evolution in public school science curricula.  
Proponents of ID have gone to great lengths in trying to separate the theory from the creationist 
theories that came before it, which were struck down by the Supreme Court as violating the 
Establishment Clause.  After examining the relevant theories and constitutional jurisprudence, it 
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is my belief that ID will suffer the same fate as its predecessors and will be found 
unconstitutional.  Proponents of the theory claim ID is both religiously neutral and scientifically 
valid.339  However, because ID depends on the existence of a supernatural creator, I think it will 
be very difficult, if not impossible for a court to find that ID is not religious.  Likewise, because 
ID’s central hypothesis cannot be tested or falsified I believe ID will not be able to be called 
valid science under any test a court may use.  Those two factors will likely cause ID to fail the 
relevant Establishment Clause tests.  Because ID cannot be considered valid science, it will have 
no secular purpose under the Lemon test.340  And, because a reasonable student would know ID’s 
religious roots and inherently religious principles, he or she would perceive teaching ID in a 
public school science class as endorsement of religion.341  Such a perception would cause ID to 
fail both the effects prong of Lemon and the endorsement test.  Proponents of Intelligent Design 
theory can call it whatever they choose, and cloak it in as much scientific rhetoric as they please, 
but in the end the fact that ID embraces religious beliefs and cannot be considered valid science 
will ultimately prevent it from being constitutionally taught in a science classroom.  If done 
properly, the theory of ID could still end up being taught in public schools.  But as to being 
taught in public school science classes as a valid alternative to evolution, I don’t think it has a 
prayer. 
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